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INTRODUCTION 
The United States is in the throes of a public health crisis of 
epidemic proportions.1  In 2002, America had the highest obesity rate 
of all industrialized countries.2  Government studies indicate that 
approximately sixty-one percent of U.S. adults, or approximately 108 
million people, are either overweight or obese.3  Children are also 
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 1 PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE 
SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND 
OBESITY XIII (2001) [hereinafter CALL TO ACTION]; see also Press Release, National 
Institutes of Health, National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, NHLBI’s 
Framingham Heart Study Finds Strong Link Between Overweight/Obesity and Risk 
for Heart Failure (July 31, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Press Release, 
NIH]; Cara B. Ebbeling et al., Childhood Obesity: Public Health Crisis, Common Sense 
Cure, 360 THE LANCET 473 (2002); Centers for Disease Control, Obesity Trends 1991– 
2001 Prevalence of Obesity Among U.S. Adults by State, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/trend/prev_reg.htm (showing the 
Center for Disease Control’s  statistics for the prevalence of and trends towards the 
spread of the obesity epidemic by state and by region) (last visited Mar. 15, 2004). 
 2 CENTER FOR NUTRITION POLICY AND PROMOTION, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, 
CHILDHOOD OBESITY: CAUSES & PREVENTIONS, SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 8 (1998), 
available at http://www.usda.gov/cnpp/Seminars/obesity.PDF. 
 3 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY FUNDAMENTAL TO PREVENTING 
DISEASE 4 (2002) [hereinafter PHYSICAL ACTIVITY].  “Overweight” and “obesity” are 
medical terms denoting weight categories.  The body mass index (“BMI”) formula 
determines overweight and obesity.  CALL TO ACTION, supra note 1, at 4. “BMI is a 
measure of weight in relation to height.  BMI is calculated as weight in pounds 
divided by the square of the height in inches, multiplied by 703.” Id.  It is limited as 
an accurate gauge in some instances in which an individual is either very muscular or 
elderly.  Id.  The National Institute of Health (“NIH”) developed Clinical Guidelines to 
define overweight as having a BMI of between 25.0 and 29.9, and obesity as having a 
BMI of greater than or equal to 30.0 in adults.Id.In children aged two to twenty, the 
calculations for overweight and obesity differ.  Id. at 6.  “Overweight has been 
defined as a sex- and age-specific BMI at or above the 95th percentile, based on 
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affected by the obesity epidemic.4  Childhood obesity is a serious 
problem that impinges on physical and psychological health,5 and 
 
revised CDC growth charts.”  Id.  Obesity is not specifically defined as it is for adults, 
and is used interchangeably with overweight when describing children.  Id. 
There has been a dramatic rise in overweight and obesity rates in the American 
population in the last decade.  Ali Mokdad et al., The Spread of the Obesity Epidemic in 
the United States, 1991-1998, 282 JAMA 1519, 1520 (1999) (“These data show that 
obesity increased in every state, in both sexes, and across all age groups, races, 
educational levels, and smoking statuses.  Rarely do chronic conditions such as 
obesity spread with the speed and dispersion characteristic of a communicable 
disease epidemic.”).  Dr. David Satcher, former Surgeon General, recently declared 
that left unabated, obesity will rival cigarette smoking in its causal connection to 
preventable disease and death.  CALL TO ACTION, supra note 1, at XIII.  The U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) estimates that 300,000 deaths 
a year are the result of obesity.  Id. at 1; see also David B. Allison et al., Annual Deaths 
Attributable to Obesity in the United States, 282 JAMA 1530 (1999) (estimating the 
number of adults dying specifically from obesity at 280,000 per annum).  “In 2000, 
the total cost of overweight and obesity was estimated to be $117 billion.”  PHYSICAL 
ACTIVITY, supra, at 4; see also Guijing Wang & William H. Dietz, Economic Burden of 
Obesity in Youths Aged 6 to 17 Years: 1979 - 1999, 109 PEDIATRICS e81 (2002), at 
http://www.pediatrics.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).  President George W. Bush 
recently acknowledged the problem on June 20, 2002, by issuing Executive Order 
13266 which authorized “improv[ing] the Federal Government’s assistance of 
individuals, private organizations, and State and local governments to (i) increase 
physical activity; [and] (ii) promote responsible dietary habits . . . .”  Exec. Order No. 
13266, 67 Fed. Reg. 42467 (June 24, 2002). 
 4 See PHYSICAL ACTIVITY, supra note 3, at 13.  From 1974 to 1999, the percentage 
of children aged six to eleven years suffering from serious weight gain increased 
from four percent to thirteen percent, and for children aged twelve to nineteen years 
the rate rose from six percent to fourteen percent.  Id.  Another recent study 
revealed that ten percent of children aged two to five are overweight and that fifteen 
percent of children between six and nineteen years are overweight.  Cynthia L. 
Ogden et al., Prevalence and Trends in Overweight Amount US Children and Adolescents, 
1999 - 2000, 288 JAMA 1728, 1729 (2002).  This study used the most recent statistics 
from the 1999-2000 National Health and Nutrition Examination Study (“NHANES”).  
Id. at 1728.  The information was collected from “a nationally representative cross-
sectional survey of the total civilian noninstitutionalized population in the United 
States.”  Id.  African-American children and children of Hispanic descent have a 
greater risk of becoming obese than white children, although all three population 
segments have realized a significant increase in obesity as measured by the body mass 
index (BMI) over the past ten years.  Id. at 1730-31.  For an explanation of BMI, see 
supra note 3.  Studies comparing variables such as parents’ education levels and 
family income suggest that obesity is more prevalent among lower socioeconomic 
classes of minority racial and ethnic groups.  Charlotte A. Schoenborn et al., Body 
Weight Status of Adults: United States, 1997 - 1998, 330 ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL AND 
HEALTH STATISTICS 1, 3-7 (2002); see also Katheleen M. McTigue et al., The Natural 
History of the Development of Obesity in a Cohort of Young U.S. Adults between 1981 and 
1998, 136 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 857 (2002).  The authors of this study suggest 
that “race or ethnicity and sex are likely surrogates, totally or in part, for other 
factors, such as dietary and exercise standards, income, education, and parity.” 
McTigue et al., supra, at 863. 
 5 See infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.  American children are 
contracting nutrition-related diseases such as obesity, gallbladder disease, and type-II 
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foreshadows severe health consequences in adulthood.6 
In attempting to counteract the trend in weight gain among 
American children, legislators, government agencies, and public-
health advocates have increasingly turned to schools as a prime arena 
in which to promote good nutrition and eating behaviors.7  Schools 
are recognized “as a key setting for public health strategies to prevent 
and decrease the prevalence of overweight and obesity.”8  Yet, schools 
are playing a culpable role in fostering obesity among American 
children.  Many schools serve unhealthy food and beverages à la carte 
in school cafeterias, including soft drinks, candy, and fast-food items, 
the daily consumption of which can lead to serious health problems.9  
Rather than working to counteract childhood obesity and poor 
 
diabetes, as well as bone fractures, an early warning sign of osteoporosis, at startling 
rates. 
 6 See Mary K. Serdula et al., Do Obese Children Become Obese Adults? A Review of the 
Literature, 22 PREVENTATIVE MED. 167 (1993) (examining epidemiologic literature 
published from 1970 to 1992 which studied the relationship between childhood 
obesity and the prevalence of the condition in adulthood).  Results of the 
examination of the literature indicate that 
[a]bout a third (26 to 41%) of obese preschool children were obese as 
adults, and about half (42 to 63%) of obese school-age children were 
obese as adults.  For all studies and across all ages, the risk of adult 
obesity was at least twice as high for obese children as for nonobese 
children.  The risk of adult obesity was greater for children who were at 
higher levels of obesity and for children who were obese at older ages. 
Id. at 167. 
 7 See Public Health Service, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Guidelines 
for School Health Programs to Promote Lifelong Healthy Eating, 45 MMWR 1 (1996) (“The 
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Nutrition Education and Training (NET) 
Program urges ‘nutrition education [to] be a major educational component of all 
child nutrition programs and offered in all schools, child care facilities, and summer 
sites’ by the year 2000.”) [hereinafter Guidelines for School Health Programs]; Howell 
Wechsler et al., Food Service and Food and Beverages Available at School: Results from the 
School Health Policies and Programs Study 2000, 71 J. SCH. HEALTH 313 (2001).  The 
report stated: 
Schools are in a unique position to promote healthy dietary behaviors 
and help ensure appropriate nutrient intake.  More than one-half of 
young people in the United States get either breakfast or lunch, and 
one in ten get both, from a school meal program.  In addition, 
students at many schools obtain snacks from a variety of venues (e.g., à 
la carte sales, vending machines, school stores, snack bars, classroom 
parties, and concession stands).  School food service staff can promote 
healthy eating through the food they make available each day in the 
school cafeteria and the opportunities they have to reinforce nutrition 
education taught in the classroom. 
Wechsler et al., supra. 
 8 CALL TO ACTION, supra note 1, at 19. 
 9 See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the types of food served in school 
cafeterias, and Part III.C for a discussion of the subsequent health consequences of a 
diet of food high in fats, sugars, salt, cholesterol. 
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nutrition, schools are increasingly ignoring their students’ health as 
they seize opportunities to profit from the sale of candy, soda, salty 
snacks, and fast food—all high in calories, fat, and cholesterol. 
Presumably, schools have a duty to maintain a safe and healthy 
environment for their students.10  Schools have a responsibility to 
schoolchildren because children, while at school, are a captive 
audience, and in most jurisdictions students are not permitted to 
leave the premises during lunch period.  Moreover, schools are 
deemed to act in loco parentis,11 and thus they have a duty to act as a 
reasonable parent in making decisions that affect the health and well-
being of their students.  Schools may well breach that duty by serving, 
and thereby implicitly endorsing, unhealthy fast food, beverages, and 
snacks in order to generate a profit. 
This Comment analyzes whether schools may be found negligent 
for serving unhealthy, harmful food in their cafeterias.  Part I of this 
Comment identifies the current practices and policies concerning the 
availability of food to schoolchildren.  Part II discusses whether 
federal preemption or the doctrine of municipal immunity provides 
local public school districts with an absolute defense from suit. Part II 
concludes that neither federal preemption nor municipal immunity 
is likely to bar a claim for negligence in the school food context. 
Part III explains how a school district that provides unhealthy à 
la carte fast food or food of minimal nutritional value (snacks and 
sodas) may be found liable for negligence.  This section examines the 
elements of negligence—duty, breach, causation, and damages—to 
determine the structure and the viability of such a claim.  This section 
concludes that a school district has a duty to maintain a healthful 
environment, and consequently breaches this duty by permitting 
access to fast food, candy, salty snacks, and sugared beverages. 
I. SCHOOL MEAL PRACTICES 
A. The National School Lunch Act 
During the Great Depression of the early 1930s, despite a 
surplus of food in agricultural markets, large numbers of American 
families were unable to procure adequate food.  As a result, the 
federal government commenced a national school lunch program to 
 
 10 See infra Part III.A.1 for an explanation of the duty of a school or board of 
education to its schoolchildren. 
 11 In loco parentis is translated as “in the place of the parent.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 791 (7th ed. 1999).  The term applies to someone who acts in the 
capacity of a parent as a temporary guardian of a child.  Id. 
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provide schoolchildren with nutritious food12 as well as to “dissipate 
the glut in the agricultural markets.”13  Food donations to schools 
lasted only until the early 1940s, however, when the demand for food 
in World War I increased to the point that surplus food donations 
were virtually eliminated.14  In place of food donations, the federal 
government offered schools cash reimbursements to purchase food 
locally.15 
In 1946, Congress enacted the National School Lunch Act 
(“NSLA”).16  The purpose of the NSLA was “to safeguard the health 
and well-being of the Nation’s children and to encourage the 
domestic consumption of nutritious agricultural commodities and 
other food” by assisting states to establish and expand nonprofit 
school lunch programs.17  In passing the NSLA, the federal 
government thereby provided needy schoolchildren with free or low-
cost lunches.18  Although the Department of Agriculture oversaw the 
NSLA during the first decade of its existence, inadequate funds and 
poor administration plagued the program.19 
The structure of the present-day school lunch program derives 
from amendments to the NSLA beginning in the 1960s.  In the 1962 
amendments, Congress changed the apportionment formula for 
funds thereby encouraging states to extend the program to include 
more schools and more children.20  In 1966, Congress passed the 
Child Nutrition Act (“CNA”), an act with a parallel purpose that 
established both breakfast and milk programs.21  Since the 1960s, 
Congress has broadened the NSLA to encompass other nonprofit 
organizations, such as day-care centers22 and adult-care facilities.23  
Congress has also extended the NSLA to cover the provision of after-
 
 12 S. REP. NO. 2016 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3244, 3245. 
 13 Sheila A. Taenzler, The National School Lunch Program, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 372 
(1970). 
 14 S. REP. NO. 2016 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3244, 3245. 
 15 Id. 
 16 ch. 281, 60 Stat. 230 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 1751-1769(h) 
(2000)); see generally S. REP. NO. 553 (1945) (describing the historical background 
and the policies considered in enacting the National School Lunch Act). 
 17 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000). 
 18 See 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
 19 Taenzler, supra note 13, at 373. 
 20 S. REP. NO. 2016 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3244, 3248. 
 21 Pub. L. No. 89-642, 80 Stat. 885 (1966) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.      
§§ 1771-1791(f) (2000)). 
 22 42 U.S.C. § 1766(a) (2000); see also 7 C.F.R. § 226 (2002). 
 23 42 U.S.C. § 1766(o) (2000); see also 7 C.F.R. § 226 (2002). 
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care snacks24 and summer food service programs.25 
The Healthy Meals for Healthy Americans Act of 199426 
amended the CNA and NSLA to require that school meals conform 
to the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (“DGA”).  A notable 
provision in that amendment directed the following: 
State educational agencies, schools, and school food service 
authorities shall, to the maximum extent practicable, inform 
students who participate in the school lunch and school breakfast 
programs, and parents and guardians of the students, of - (A) the 
nutritional content of the lunches and breakfasts that are served 
under the programs; and (B) the consistency of the lunches and 
breakfasts with the guidelines contained in the most recent 
“Dietary Guidelines for Americans” . . . including the consistency 
of the lunches and breakfasts with the guideline for fat content.27 
This stringent requirement mandating parental notification of the 
nutritional value of food no longer exists in the current version of the 
NSLA;28 instead, a more general provision requires that the food 
served in school meals meet the current DGA allowances, as well as 
daily recommended dietary allowances (“RDA”).29  The deletion of 
the parental notification requirement is a significant change in the 
statute, especially when coupled with additional modifications to the 
NSLA that permit schools to outsource food service to food-service 
management companies.30  Therefore, in eliminating parental 
oversight of food-service companies’ meal offerings, the current 
statutory regime undermines the ability of parents and caregivers to 
plan properly for the dietary care of schoolchildren.31  
Schoolchildren and parents must now rely on their local school 
boards to ensure that healthy food choices are provided for lunch, 
rather than a menu of unhealthy fast-food selections. 
 
 24 42 U.S.C. § 1766a(a) (2000); see also 7 C.F.R. § 210.2 (2002). 
 25 42 U.S.C. § 1761 (2000); see also 7 C.F.R. § 225 (2002). 
 26 Pub. L. No. 103-448, 108 Stat. 4699 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C 
§§ 1751-1769g(h) (1994)). 
 27 42 U.S.C. §1758 (f)(1) (1994). 
 28 The 1994 provision was stricken in 1996 in amendments to the National 
School Lunch Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 702(c), 110 Stat. 2287, 2288-89 (1996). 
 29 42 U.S.C. § 1758(f)(1)(A)-(B) (2000). 
 30 See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the current federal regulations and the 
provisions permitting schools to out-source their meal programs. 
 31 Only federally-subsidized meals, those made available to financially-eligible 
children, must comport with RDA and DGA guidelines.  Wechsler et al., supra note 7.  
All other food, those served à la carte, for example, do not have to meet these 
nutritional guidelines.  Id. 
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B. Current Federal Regulations and the Rise of Food-Service Contracts 
Today, the NSLA and the CNA provide a comprehensive meal 
program serving millions of eligible schoolchildren each year.32  In 
2001, an estimated 46,972,000 American children attended public 
elementary and secondary schools in the United States,33 with an 
overwhelming majority of the elementary schools (94%), middle 
schools (89.4%), and high schools (73.4%) requiring students to 
remain on school grounds during lunch period.34  Through the 
National School Lunch Program (“NSLP” or “the Program”),35 public 
schools served 27,123,419 federally subsidized, daily lunches in 2000–
2001.36  During the same year, however, it was reported that “almost 
80% of schoolchildren did not consume the recommended 5 or 
more servings of fruit and vegetables per day.”37  In fact, although the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) requires schools to serve 
meals that meet the DGA standards,38 “the average total fat and 
 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b) (2002).  The eligibility requirements for free or reduced-
price school meals are adjusted annually.  See, e.g., Child Nutrition Programs—
Income Eligibility Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. 8933-34 (Feb. 27, 2002).  Schools serve 
meals free of charge 
to children whose household income is at or below 130 percent of the 
Federal poverty guidelines.  Children are entitled to pay a reduced 
price (a maximum of 40 cents for lunch, 30 cents for breakfast and 15 
cents for a snack) if their household income is above 130 percent but 
at or below 185 percent of the guidelines. 
Food Nutrition Service, U.S. Dep’t Agriculture, Answers to Frequently Asked 
Questions, at http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/menu/faqs/faqs.htm (last visited Feb. 
17, 2003). 
 33 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
UNITED STATES: 2002 146 (122d ed. 2002). 
 34 Centers for Disease Control, School Health Policies and Programs Study 2000, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dash/shpps/factsheets/fs01_food_sold_ 
outside_school.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2004) (on file with author). 
 35 “Program” refers to the National School Lunch Program.  7 C.F.R. § 210.1 
(2002). 
 36 FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, STATE OF THE STATES: A PROFILE OF FOOD 
AND NUTRITION PROGRAMS ACROSS THE NATION 1 (2002).  The above figures are for 
federally-subsidized meals only and do not take into account the à la carte menu 
items available during breakfast, lunch, and snack times at school.  Id.; see also Food 
Nutrition Service, U.S. Dep’t Agriculture, School Lunch Program Fact Sheets, at 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/lunch/AboutLunch/NSLPFactSheet.htm (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2004).  The federal meal program currently operates in approximately 
99,800 schools.  Id. 
 37 Ogden et al., supra note 4, at 1731. 
 38 The Dietary Guidelines for Americans recommend limiting consumption of 
total fat to no more than thirty percent of calories and saturated fat to less than ten 
percent of calories, and includes recommended daily allowances for vitamins and 
minerals.  U.S. DEP’T AGRICULTURE & U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 29-30 (5th ed. 2000); see also SCHOOL LUNCH 
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saturated fat content of school breakfasts and lunches are still above 
DGA targets.”39 
Even though school meal programs throughout the United 
States provide millions of federally sponsored lunches daily, these 
meal plans experience significant waste and relatively low 
participation among eligible students because of the “notoriously 
poor taste[] [and] appearance” of the food.40  Notably, the 
participation rate among eligible schoolchildren in the NSLP is 
declining at the same time school enrollment is increasing.41  This 
paradox can be explained by examining a 1986 change in the NSLA.  
That year, the NSLA was amended to permit schools to contract 
privately with food-service companies to serve à la carte food, as long 
as those food suppliers also agreed to offer free and reduced-price 
meals to eligible children.42  Since then, an increasing number of 
school districts in the United States have contracted with corporate 
food-service companies to manage their meal programs.43  The 
inclusion of à la carte competitive food in meal programs, however, 
has been criticized.  The Food, Nutrition and Consumer Services 
(“FNCS”) division of the USDA recently declared in a report to 
Congress that “competitive foods [offered à la carte or through 
vending machines] undermine the nutrition integrity of the 
 
PROGRAM FACT SHEETS, supra note 36 (“School lunches must meet Federal nutrition 
requirements, but decisions about what specific food to serve and how they are 
prepared are made by local school food authorities.”). 
 39 Wechsler et al., supra note 7. 
 40 MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES 
NUTRITION AND HEALTH 192 (2002).  Nestle states that only fifty-eight percent of 
eligible children participate.  Id.  See generally RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, & ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT DIV., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASTE FROM SCHOOL 
LUNCHES, GAO/RCED-96-128R (1996) (providing an in-depth, statistical analysis of 
school lunch waste). 
 41 See FOOD NUTRITION AND CONSUMER SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T AGRICULTURE, FOOD 
SOLD IN COMPETITION WITH USDA SCHOOL MEAL PROGRAMS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 
(2001) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS]; see also Food Nutrition Service, U.S. Dep’t 
Agriculture, National School Lunch Current Participation (providing a state-by-state 
account of participation rates in the NSLP between November 2002 and November 
2003), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/slcurren.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 
2004). 
 42 Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 324, 100 Stat. 1783, 361 (1986) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 
1758 to add section (e)).  This subsection pertains to schools that provide federally 
subsidized meals.  Schools that meet an exemption, such as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:33-
5 (1999), which exempts schools with less than 5 percent of pupils meeting  federal 
eligibility requirements, are not so regulated.  Aramark is an example of a food 
service company that services school districts.  See Aramark website, at 
http://www.aramark.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2003). 
 43 NESTLE, supra note 40, at 193-94. 
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programs and discourage participation.”44 
The Food and Nutrition Service (“FNS”) of the USDA 
promulgated the current federal regulations for the administration of 
the NSLP.  These regulations adhere to the provisions of the NSLA 
with regard to the DGA and RDA nutritional standards for federally 
subsidized meals.45  The regulations, however, also permit the sale of 
competitive food (food offered à la carte) and food of minimal 
nutritional value (“FMNV”), neither of which is required to meet 
DGA and RDA nutritional standards.46  The regulations define 
competitive food as “any food sold in competition with the Program 
to children in food service areas during the lunch periods.”47  
Although any food sold, other than federally sponsored lunches, falls 
into the “competitive” category, competitive foods are typically 
popular fast food offered to entice children to pay more and waste 
less,48 including name-brand items from McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, and 
Taco Bell, as well as generic, unbranded selections of hamburgers, 
cheeseburgers, French fried potatoes, sandwiches, salty snacks, 
chocolate candy, and ice cream.49 
The only restriction on the sale of competitive food is that “all 
income from the sale of such food accrues to the benefit of the 
nonprofit school food service or the school or student organizations 
approved by the school.”50  This provision, therefore, creates a strong 
financial justification for school boards to approve the service of non-
nutritional food during school lunch periods.  Furthermore, this 
regulation also has the effect of placing “schools in the position of 
competing with their own [federal] school meal programs for 
revenue, contributing to decreases in student participation in the 
[federal] school meals programs with the related loss of revenue to 
 
 44 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 41. 
 45 7 C.F.R. § 210.10 (2002). 
 46 7 C.F.R. § 210.11 (2002); see also Wechsler et al., supra note 7 (“Nutritional 
standards of the USDA’s School Meals Initiative for Healthy Children do not apply to 
food sold outside of the USDA federally funded school breakfasts and lunch 
programs.”). 
 47 7 C.F.R. § 210.11(a)(1) (2002). 
 48 See NESTLE, supra note 40, at 194.  Students pay more because schools charge 
more money for à la carte food. Id.  Furthermore, students waste less food because 
fast-food choices, whether name-brand or generic, are more appealing to them.  See 
id. at 194; see also Elizabeth Becker & Marian Burros, Eat Your Vegetables? Only at a Few 
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2003, at A1, A14 (“[C]afeterias also serve à la carte food 
that are higher in fat, sugar[,] and calories, but are what students prefer over the 
more nutritious federally subsidized meals.”). 
 49 Wechsler et al., supra note 7. 
 50 7 C.F.R. § 210.11(b) (2002). 
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support the viability of the programs.”51 
The federal regulations define FMNV as soda water (commonly 
known as carbonated soft drinks), water ices not containing fruit or 
fruit juice, chewing gum, and certain candies such as hard candy, 
jellies and gums, marshmallow candies, fondant, licorice, spun candy, 
and candy-coated popcorn.52  The federal regulations only prohibit 
the sale of some FMNV in food-service areas during lunch periods.53  
For example, carbonated soft drinks cannot be sold in the cafeteria, 
but may be offered just outside the entrance to the cafeteria.  There 
are no restrictions on the sale of “chips, most candy bars, and 
noncarbonated, high-sugar drinks that are not 100% juice.”54 
Food and beverages from soft drink vending machines, ice 
cream vending machines, and candy vending machines are widely 
available in public schools.55  Increasingly, school districts across the 
nation are forming lucrative, multi-million dollar “pouring rights” 
contracts with soft drink manufacturers for access to the student 
market.56  These contracts often specify annual sales quotas that the 
school district must achieve in order to maintain payment levels from 
the soft-drink companies.57  These sales goals, however, place schools 
 
 51 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 41. 
 52 7 C.F.R. § 210 app. B (2002). 
 53 7 C.F.R. § 210.11(b) (2002).  Restrictions apply only to those items listed in 
Appendix B.  Id. 
 54 Wechsler et al., supra note 7. 
 55 ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL 
51-57 (2002). 
 56 Id. at 53; see also NESTLE, supra note 40, at 197–218. Companies such as Coca-
Cola, PepsiCo, and Cadbury-Schweppes bid aggressively on school district business.  
Id. at 203.  In Charleston County, South Carolina, the school district formed a 
pouring rights contract with Pepsi Bottling Group valued at eight million dollars over 
five years.  NOW with Bill Moyers: Buying Access (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 18, 
2002), at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript_schools.html (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2002).  The contract terms were described as follows: 
The [school] district gets an annual fifty thousand dollars cash, after 
year one of the five-year contract.  There’s also scholarship money, free 
drinks for some events, and as if the district were a pro-sports superstar, 
it gets a signing bonus—one million dollars cash just for closing the 
deal.  But for all the up front money, the real pop to the contract is the 
commissions.  More than half that potential 8 million dollars depends 
on the success of soda sales.  Schools get 40 cents every time someone 
spends a dollar on a drink from a vending machine.  That jumps to 43 
cents if the school installs on machine for every 125 students.  West 
Ashley High School [in Charleston County] has far surpassed that.  It 
has one machine for every fifty students—44 machines in all. 
Id. 
 57 SCHLOSSER, supra note 55, at 57.  For example, in Colorado, “School District 11 
was obligated to sell at least seventy thousand cases of Coca-Cola products a year, 
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and school officials in conflict with their duty to promote a healthy 
environment for their students.58  Indeed, schools may have a 
financial incentive to disregard federal time-and-place regulations59 in 
order to increase access to FMNV.60  School districts, confronted with 
mounting financial pressures, are tempted to permit students to 
“drink Coca-Cola during class,” or if not soda, to “drink fruit juices, 
teas, and bottled waters also sold in the Coke machines.”61  Instead of 
fostering the lessons of good nutrition taught in most school health 
classes, schools are “teaching excess.”62  Thus, actions taken by school 
districts to realize their full contractual benefits are inimical to their 
duty to provide a safe and healthy environment for their students.63 
 
within the first three years of the contract, or it would face reduced payments by 
Coke.”   Id.  More recently, Coca-Cola has revised its financial arrangements with 
schools so that it no longer pays upfront money.  Coca-Cola Co., Model Guidelines 
for School Beverage Partnerships: Contracts and Financial Arrangements, at 
http://www2.coca-cola.com/ourcompany/hal_school_guidelines_contracts.html.  Its 
corporate guidelines state that contracts between Coca-Cola and schools should 
“[b]e structured to offer schools a steady stream of resources for the length of the 
partnership, as opposed to relying on an advance payment.”  Id.  According to Coca-
Cola, “[t]his approach frees school officials from stipulations that beverage sales 
must meet an expected revenue goal and evens out budget fluctuations from year to 
year.”  Id. 
 58 See SCHLOSSER, supra note 55, at 56-57; infra Part III.A.1 and accompanying 
notes on a school’s duty. 
 59 The federal regulations state that “the sale of food of minimal nutritional 
value, as listed in appendix B of this part” shall be prohibited “in the food service 
areas during the lunch periods.”  7 C.F.R. § 210.11(b) (2002). 
 60 There is substantial concern that school districts are not following the federal 
regulations with regard to the provision of competitive food and FMNV.  For 
example, a memorandum to State Directors of childhood nutrition programs 
notified the State Directors that the Department of Agriculture’s Office of the 
Inspector General had concluded an audit of food service management company 
(FSMC) participation in the NSLP. Memorandum from Food Nutrition Service, to 
State Agency Directors (Apr. 2002) (on file with author).  The memorandum states 
that “FNS is concerned with the audit’s conclusion that existing regulations, policy 
and guidance are not followed by State agencies, school food authorities (SFAs) and 
FSMCs in operating the NSLP.”  Id.  This memorandum echoes an earlier one 
written by the Director of the Child Nutrition Division of the FNS in January 2001, 
which encouraged state agencies to “disallow all meals served by a school on any day 
that a violation of the regulations [pertaining to FMNV] is observed and to be 
diligent in monitoring compliance with corrective action plans.”  Memorandum 
from Stanley C. Garnett, Director Child Nutrition Division of FNS, to Regional 
Directors Special Nutrition Programs 4 (Jan. 16, 2001) (on file with author). 
 61 SCHLOSSER, supra note 55, at 57.  Schlosser also reports that a school 
administrator in Colorado suggested to district school principals to “move Coke 
machines to places where they would be accessible to students all day.”  Id. 
 62 NOW with Bill Moyers: Buying Access, supra note 56. 
 63 See infra Part III.A. for a discussion of schools’ duty and breach of duty to 
maintain a safe and healthy environment. 
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II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY AS A 
BAR TO STATE LAW CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENCE AGAINST 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS THAT SERVE UNHEALTHY FOOD AND 
BEVERAGES 
If faced with a negligence suit, schools might assert two potential 
defenses—federal preemption and municipal immunity.  Each 
defense is discussed below, as it would relate to a school’s liability for 
serving harmful food and beverages in schools. 
A. Federal Preemption 
The Constitution provides that “Laws of the United States . . . 
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.”64  Consequently, federal 
preemption analysis acts as a persistent reminder of the inherent 
conflicts that can arise between federal enactments and state laws;65 
indeed, “[p]reemption principles have . . . been at the center of 
many hard-fought legal battles involving important issues of 
economic and social policy.”66  The issue here is whether the NSLA 
preempts a negligence claim against a local school district for its 
decision to serve schoolchildren unhealthy à la carte food and FMNV. 
Preemption analysis falls into two categories: express 
preemption and implied preemption.67  Express preemption occurs 
when Congress has spoken directly to the preemptive effect of a 
statute.68  In analyzing express preemption, the Supreme Court has 
required clear evidence of congressional intent to preempt state law.69  
Therefore, the statutory language must provide a solid basis upon 
which to conclude, after further examining legislative history, that 
Congress intended its statute to preempt state law.70  If no intent to 
preempt can be detected from the express text of the statute and 
legislative history, a court may still invoke the doctrine of implied 
preemption to determine legislative intent inferentially.71  “[I]mplied 
 
 64 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 65 KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION 1 (1991). 
 66 Id. at 1-2. 
 67 Id. at 14-15. 
 68 Id. at 15. 
 69 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 377 (2d 
ed. 2002). 
 70 STARR ET AL., supra note 65, at 18. 
 71 Id. (noting that implied preemption is in conflict with the Court’s oft-stated 
requirement that there be a “‘clear and manifest’ expression of congressional 
intent”); see also New York State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 
(1973) (“[I]f Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention 
clearly.  It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the 
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preemption is often a function of both perceived congressional 
intent and the language used in the statute or regulation.”72  Thus, 
the boundaries between express and implied preemption are not 
easily delineated.73 
Implied preemption is further divided into several subcategories: 
field preemption; conflict preemption; and administrative 
preemption.  These categories also frequently overlap in the attempt 
to discern congressional intent.74  Field preemption occurs “where 
the scheme of federal law and regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.’”75  Indeed, the Court has frequently stated its basic 
“assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to 
be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”76  Administrative preemption is very 
similar to field preemption and is potentially deemed to exist when 
extensive federal regulations serve as an indication that Congress 
intended to occupy the field.77  For the purpose of this analysis, 
administrative preemption will be discussed under the rubric of field 
preemption. 
Conflict preemption exists “where compliance with both federal 
and state regulations is a physical impossibility or where a state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”78  The problem here is 
determining whether a conflict exists between a federal and state 
law.79  For example, a federal law that is deemed to set a minimum 
standard is unlikely to be viewed in conflict with a state law that 
requires more stringent standards.80  As a general premise, state laws, 
that reinforce federal programs, will be enforceable, whereas state 
 
exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to 
do so.  The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.”) (citing 
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)). 
 72 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 69, at 377. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. 
 75 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 69, at 378 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 76 Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 
(1985) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230). 
 77 STARR ET AL., supra note 65, at 18-34. 
 78 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 79 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 69, at 391. 
 80 Id. at 391-92 (discussing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 
U.S. 132 (1963)). 
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laws, that impede or limit the government in the administration of 
federal programs, will be preempted.81 
With respect to the analysis of the present issue, nothing in the 
express language of the NSLA, its legislative history, or the federal 
regulations promulgated to administer the Act indicates that 
Congress intended the NSLA to preempt state law claims for 
negligence against local school boards that provide unhealthy food, 
beverages and snacks to schoolchildren.  Indeed, the purpose of the 
Act demonstrates that Congress intended the federal government to 
act in concert with the states, by providing financial assistance to 
states in their pursuit to advance and protect the public health: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress, as a measure of 
national security, to safeguard the health and well-being of the 
Nation’s children and to encourage the domestic consumption of 
nutritious agricultural commodities and other food, by assisting the 
States, through grants-in-aid and other means, in providing an 
adequate supply of food and other facilities for the establishment, 
maintenance, operation, and expansion of nonprofit school 
lunch programs.82 
By providing assistance to states, Congress has recognized the states’ 
primary role as guardians of the health and well-being of their 
citizenry.  Thus, a state law negligence claim against a school district 
that provides unhealthy food and beverages to the schoolchildren 
under its supervision promotes and enforces the policies described in 
the NSLA and its regulations—to provide nutritious food to children 
in order to preserve their health and well-being83 and to ensure that 
children develop a sound understanding of the importance of proper 
nutrition and good health.84 
Arguments for field preemption and conflict preemption are 
also likely to fail.  In the case of field preemption, although the FNS 
 
 81 Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Construction and Application of National School 
Lunch Act and Child Nutrition Act of 1966, 14 A.L.R. FED 634, § 7 (1973). 
 82 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000) (emphasis added). Additionally, the federal 
regulations state: 
the Department provides States with general and special cash assistance 
and donations of food acquired by the Department to be used to assist 
schools in serving nutritious lunches to children each school day.  In 
furtherance of Program objectives, participating schools shall serve 
lunches that are nutritionally adequate, as set forth in these 
regulations, and shall to the extent practicable, ensure that 
participating children gain a full understanding of the relationship 
between proper eating and good health. 
7 C.F.R. § 210.1 (2002). 
 83 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000). 
 84 7 C.F.R. § 210.1 (2002). 
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has developed extensive regulations to govern schools that participate 
in the NSLP, participation in the federal program is ultimately 
voluntary.85  Therefore, schools may serve lunches that are 
overwhelmingly composed of fast food and other unhealthy snacks 
and beverages without federal consequences.86  And, by analyzing 
conflict preemption, it is clear that a state negligence action would 
not obstruct the federal objectives of the NSLA,87 because the federal 
nutritional requirements do not apply to the competitive food or 
FMNV served outside the federal program.88  In fact, the negligence 
action reinforces the objectives of the federal lunch program.  A 
negligence cause of action in this context addresses, at the local level, 
the school board’s decision to offer an unrestricted diet of fat, 
cholesterol, salt, and sugar in return for lunchtime profits.  
Consequently, seeking to enforce good nutrition and the health of 
schoolchildren by holding local school boards negligent for their 
decisions to provide regular access to unhealthy food and beverages 
would not be invalidated by preemption principles. 
B. Municipal Immunity 
A further school district defense might be municipal immunity.  
The law of municipal immunity89 is complex and murky and varies 
from state to state.90  Municipal immunity, derived from English law, 
relates to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and is “associated with 
the idea that ‘the King can do no wrong.’”91  Historically, 
municipalities were not recognized as sovereigns, like states or the 
 
 85 Kramer, supra note 81, at § 6a. 
 86 Some municipalities are exempted from participation in the NSLP by state 
statute.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:33-5 (1999) (exempting schools with less than 
five percent of pupils meeting federal eligibility requirements).  These schools may 
nonetheless provide food for lunches and are not required to adhere to federal 
nutritional guidelines.  See Wechsler et al., supra note 7. 
 87 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 88 See Wechsler et al., supra note 7 (noting that federal nutritional standards do 
not apply to food sold outside the federally funded meal programs). 
 89 A discussion of the scope and breadth of the law of municipal immunity 
nationwide is outside the parameters of this Comment.  For good overviews of 
municipal immunity, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 268-71 (2000); 57 
AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School and State Tort Liability §§ 1-118, 501-10 (2001); 
Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Modern Status of Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity As Applied 
to Public Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning, 33 A.L.R. 3D. 703 (1970). 
 90 KEETON ET AL., supra note 89, § 131, at 1052-53.  Where municipal immunity is 
retained, “it is a fertile source of litigation.”  Id. § 131, at 1053. 
 91 Id. § 131, at 1033; see also Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of 
History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2002). 
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federal government, but rather were deemed to be state-chartered 
corporations.92  This distinction led to a different way of determining 
municipal immunity, one that was narrower than traditional 
government immunity, because “municipalities [exhibit] a corporate 
or proprietary face as well as a governmental face.”93  As a result, 
governmental immunity traditionally protected municipalities against 
liability for “governmental” activities but not for “proprietary” ones.94  
Today, municipal immunity extends to local school districts to 
protect decisions made or actions taken in a governmental or 
discretionary capacity, as opposed to those made in a proprietary or 
ministerial function.95  Whether applied by statute or common law, 
some form of municipal immunity is employed in every state to limit 
the liability of governing school districts.96 
Courts apply two common tests when adjudicating the immunity 
defense, depending on the jurisdiction: the “governmental 
proprietary” test and the “discretionary ministerial” test.  The analysis 
under both tests is essentially the same, and many have criticized both 
tests as being difficult to apply.97  Under the governmental 
proprietary test, a governmental function is defined as 
 
 92 DOBBS, supra note 89, § 269, at 718. 
 93 KEETON ET AL., supra note 89, § 131, at 1051. 
 94 Id.; see also Ruth Cook, Postscript: Tracing the Governmental Proprietary Test, 53 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 561 (1984). 
 95 KEETON ET AL., supra note 89, § 131, at 1053.  In New Jersey, as in many other 
states, schools within a school district are governed by a local board of education. 
N.J. STAT. ANN § 18A:10-1 (West 1999).  The board of education is created by statute 
to perform state functions at the local level.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:11-1 (West 1999).  
Boards of education are legal entities, which have been given the power to sue or be 
sued in the corporate name.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:11-2 (West 1999).  Under the 
New Jersey Tort Claims Act, local boards of education are considered to be public 
entities, which can be immune from suit depending on whether the action in 
question is discretionary or ministerial.  N.J. STAT. ANN.  § 59:1-3 (West 1992).  For 
the purposes of this discussion the term “school district” will be used to convey the 
local governing board of education. 
 96 Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of  Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 889 app. (Pa. 1973). 
 97 See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).  Justice Frankfurter 
described the law surrounding the governmental / non-governmental distinction as 
a “quagmire.”  Id. at 65.  He further stated that comparing decisions of the forty-eight 
states would yield “irreconcilable conflict,” “disharmonious decisions,” and “disclose 
the inevitable chaos when courts try to apply a rule of law that is inherently 
unsound.”  Id. at 65; see also Murray Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to 
the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REV. 910 (1936), reprinted in 53 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 469 (1984); Mary S. Hack, Sovereign Immunity and Public Entities in Missouri: 
Clarifying the Status of Hybrid Entities, 58 MO. L. REV. 743, 748-49 (1993).  The 
governmental proprietary dichotomy has been described as a “maze of inconsistency 
. . . producing uneven and unequal results which defy understanding.”  Id. at 751 
(internal citations omitted). 
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one that is discretionary, political, legislative, or public in nature 
and performed for the public good in [sic] behalf of the state.  In 
contrast, the proprietary activities undertaken by the government 
are those that are commercial or chiefly for the private advantage 
of the compact community.  Stated simply, if the undertaking of 
the government is one in which only a governmental agency 
could engage, it is governmental in nature; it is proprietary and 
private when any corporation, individual or group of individuals 
could do the same thing.98 
The distinction between governmental and proprietary functions has 
been described as  “probably one of the most unsatisfactory known to 
the law, for it has caused confusion not only among the various 
jurisdictions but almost always within each jurisdiction.”99   
Accordingly, there is no uniform set of factors that courts apply to 
decide whether an activity is proprietary.100 
The “discretionary ministerial” dichotomy is similarly difficult to 
define and to apply.101  Under the discretionary ministerial test, 
discretionary acts are deemed to be those that require “high-level” 
policy decisions, and do not relate merely to operational or day-to-day 
decisions, which are classified as ministerial.102  “Generally, ‘high level 
policy decisions classified as discretionary acts involve planning, and 
are distinct from ministerial acts, which pertain merely to operations 
and are not immunized.’”103 
In City of Atlanta v. Chambers,104 the Georgia Court of Appeals 
applied a form of the governmental proprietary test to determine 
whether the City of Atlanta was immune from vicarious liability in a 
wrongful-death suit for the actions of a municipal employee in 
operating a city garbage truck.105  The City argued that the garbage 
collection fees paid by the public were merely a way to offset 
collection expenses, and not to generate revenue for the City to use 
as funding for other activities.106  The plaintiffs, on the other hand, 
 
 98 57 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 89, § 53, at 87-88.  
 99 Ayala, 305 A.2d at 883-84. 
 100 DOBBS, supra note 89, § 269, at 718-19.  “The governmental proprietary 
distinction can produce some surprising case outcomes.”  Id. at 719. 
 101 See John A. Gleason & Kenneth Van Winkle, Jr., The Ohio Political Subdivision 
Tort Liability Act: A Legislative Response to Judicial Abolishment of Sovereign Immunity, 55 
U. CIN. L. REV. 501, 507 (1986). 
 102 Strauss v. Township of Holmdel, 711 A.2d 1385, 1393 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1997) (citing Costa v. Josey, 415 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1980)). 
 103 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 104 424 S.E.2d 19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). 
 105 Id. at 20. 
 106 Id. 
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attempted to demonstrate that by employing other accounting 
methods, the garbage collection service would be more profitable, 
thus characterizing the operation as a source of revenue.107 
The court noted that “in general, ‘the collection of garbage is a 
governmental function, for the performance of which a municipality 
is granted immunity from liability for the negligent acts of its officers 
and employees.’”108  The court explained, however, that an exception 
to this general rule of municipal immunity “may arise where a city 
operates a garbage collection service primarily as a business 
enterprise and source of revenue, rather than primarily as a public 
service.”109  Utilizing the governmental proprietary test for municipal 
immunity, the court declared that “what is significant is the character 
of the [enterprise] as ‘primarily a source of revenue’ rather than 
being used primarily for the benefit of the public regardless of 
incidental generation of revenues.”110  Ultimately, the Chambers court 
found that the garbage collection operation was of primary benefit to 
the public and therefore imposed no liability on the City.111 
Krueger v. Board of Education of City of St. Louis112 is another 
example of a court grappling with the “governmental proprietary” 
test.  Here, the Supreme Court of Missouri dealt with municipal 
immunity in the context of the school lunchroom.  The precise issue 
before the court was whether “the fact that the defendant [school 
district] was authorized to operate a lunchroom, but not compelled 
to do so, ma[d]e its operation other than a governmental 
function.”113  In this case, a cafeteria employee was injured while 
cleaning a food-chopping machine and sued the board of education 
for negligence.114  The court held that the school board was immune 
from liability because the board of education did not receive 
“pecuniary profit” from the operation of the lunchroom, and the 
decision to voluntarily undertake the provision of lunches was a 
discretionary power given by the Legislature.115  By characterizing the 
 
 107 Id. at 21-22. 
 108 Id. at 21 (internal citations omitted). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Chambers, 424 S.E.2d at 21 (citing Cleghorn v. City of Albany, 362 S.E.2d 386 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1987)) (noting that the latter would result in no liability). 
 111 Id. at 22. 
 112 274 S.W. 811 (Mo. 1925). 
 113 Id. at 812. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 813-14.  The court stated: 
There is no good reason why a school district should be liable to an 
action for damages because voluntarily, yet pursuant to a general 
authority, it furnishes a certain convenience in aid of its schools, when, 
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board of education’s decision to operate a lunchroom as a duty to 
maintain, operate, or manage a public school in the public good, the 
court broadly recognized immunity for the school board.116  The 
court, however, noted that the school board is an instrument of the 
state only insofar as it “is entitled to no pecuniary profit from its 
services.”117 
Applying a “discretionary ministerial” analysis to determine 
municipal immunity in Costa v. Josey,118 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
examined whether the New Jersey Department of Transportation was 
immune from liability in a wrongful-death action for the negligent 
repair and maintenance of a barrier separating a highway.119  The 
administrator of the decedents’ estates claimed that the divider 
separating the eastbound and westbound lanes was negligently 
repaired when the highway was resurfaced, creating a dangerous 
condition.120  The state argued that, despite the creation of a 
hazardous condition, it was immune from suit “for an injury caused 
by the plan or design of public property either in its original 
construction or any improvement thereto, where the plan or design 
has been approved in advance of construction by a public employee 
exercising discretionary authority to give such approval.”121  The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey disagreed, however, holding that 
summary judgment for the State was inappropriate, since material 
factual issues existed “as to whether [the] original plan or design of 
[the] road contemplated that resurfacing would reduce [the] height 
of [the] dividing barrier and as to whether plans for repairing [the] 
road constituted an improvement as distinguished from 
maintenance.”122 
The Costa court interpreted the state’s statutory discretionary 
ministerial test.123  The court stated that “the exercise of discretion in 
 
if the furnishing of that convenience were made mandatory, there 
would be no liability under a like charge of negligence.  In one case the 
necessity and expediency would be determined by the Legislature; in 
the other, the necessity and expediency would be left by the Legislature 
to be determined by the local governmental agency.  In either event, it 
is the same power that is exercised, and for the same purpose. 
Id. at 814. 
 116 Id. at 813. 
 117 See Krueger, 274 S.W. at 813. 
 118 415 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1980). 
 119 Id. at 338. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 339 (internal quotations omitted). 
 122 Id. at 337. 
 123 Id. at 340-43 (referring to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3(a) (West 1992)).  The 
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NJSA 59:2-3(a) refers to actual, high-level policymaking decisions 
involving the balancing of competing considerations.”124  The court 
then announced a two-step inquiry to determine whether the 
municipality would be granted immunity for its actions.125  First, the 
exercise of discretion had to comprise basic policy-making “at the 
planning, rather than the operational level of decisionmaking.”126  
After the municipality established that it had made a planning-level 
policy decision, the municipality would also have to show that 
“discretion was actually exercised at that level by an official who, 
faced with alternative approaches, weighed the competing policy 
considerations and made a conscious choice.”127 
Applying the two-step inquiry, the Costa court reasoned that, 
“[o]nce the decision to [undertake a road maintenance program] 
was made, however, the tort immunity would seem to have ended. . . .  
At that point high-level determinations to provide a program and 
how to allocate existing resources were complete.”128  The court 
emphasized that the basic policy decision was immune, but it refused 
to expand the immunity to a decision relating to which resurfacing 
plan to undertake.129  The court concluded its analysis by stating that 
“a conscious approval of the details of the plan would not have 
removed it from the category of an operational decision. . . .  [T]here 
is nothing to indicate that any competing policy choices were actually 
considered when the resurfacing plan was made and approval 
given.”130  Ultimately, the court remanded for a full trial on immunity 
issues.131 
Although every jurisdiction has its own version of municipal 
immunity, these cases illustrate the type of analysis required to 
determine whether a school board would be immune from suit for 
 
provision states, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from the 
exercise of judgment or discretion vested in the entity.”  Id. at 340.  This provision 
was patterned after ones similarly adopted in other jurisdictions, including California 
and the federal government.  Id. at 341. 
 124 Costa, 415 A.2d at 340.  One such consideration, according to the court, might 
be where best to allocate resources.  Id. at 342. 
 125 Id. at 342.  The court relied on the test adopted by the California Supreme 
Court in Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968), to interpret the meaning of “the 
exercise of discretion,” since the New Jersey statute was modeled after the California 
statute.  Id. at 341-42. 
 126 Id. at 342. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Costa, 415 A.2d at 343. 
 131 Id. 
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unreasonably allowing harmful and unhealthy competitive à la carte 
food and vending machine snacks and beverages to be served 
regularly to schoolchildren.  The initial decision a school board 
makes to operate a lunchroom would be immune from suit under 
either governmental or discretionary analysis because the operation 
of a lunchroom is performed for the public good, and the decision 
reflects high-level policy and long-range planning considerations.  
Additionally, the decision to contract out its food service to a food-
service management company can be characterized as governmental 
or discretionary, and therefore be immune from suit.  Not only is 
contracting with outside food-service companies permitted by federal 
statute but this decision also resonates with important public policy 
considerations.  Among these concerns are the need for efficiency in 
meal preparations and the financial benefit of reducing costs by 
outsourcing food preparation compared to maintaining food-
preparation facilities within the school.  But, under either test for 
municipal immunity, a school board likely would not be immune 
from liability for its decision to provide students daily access to 
unhealthy à la carte or vending machine food. 
A school board’s decision to permit a food service management 
company to regularly serve unhealthy food and beverages cannot be 
characterized as governmental or discretionary for immunity 
purposes.  The decision to allow non-nutritious food items to pervade 
the school lunchroom is an operational and commercial one, made 
for the “private advantage of the compact community:”132 the profit 
from the sale of competitive food accrues to the school.  Simply put, 
the more schoolchildren eat hamburgers, French fries, and pizza at 
lunch, the more the school earns in revenue.  Although schools could 
likewise generate revenue from their students’ purchases of healthy 
food, schools have seemingly adopted the myopic corporate, food-
service management model of what “kids like to eat” in approving 
menus loaded with calories, fat, salt, and sugar.133 
 
 132 See text accompanying supra note 98. 
 133 FORTUNE magazine featured as its cover story a series of articles on the rising 
obesity crisis among Americans.  The issue included an article about the Calhoun 
School, a private school in Manhattan, which recently fired its commercial catering 
service and hired a teacher from the French Culinary Institute, “Chef Bobo,” to be its 
head chef.  Timothy K. Smith, We’ve Got to Stop Eating Like This, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 
2003, at 58.  The school reports the experience as positive.  See id. at 58-60.  Children 
are fed a well-balanced diet: 
Each day the kids are fed a soup, an animal entrée, a vegetable, a 
starch, and fresh fruit.  Ninety percent of what’s served is vegetarian, 
organic whenever possible.  At the start of the school year the students 
were consuming one case of vegetables a day.  Now that’s up to four 
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The analytical, two-step framework articulated in Costa can be 
applied to a school district’s decision to contract with a food-service 
company.  The initial decision to outsource meal preparation would 
necessarily involve competing policy decisions and therefore be 
immune.  Once that decision is made, however, the approval of the 
menu of à la carte fast food and unhealthy vending machine items 
would fall within an operational category.  The decision to serve 
unhealthy food and beverages would not be immune unless the 
school district could somehow show that it considered competing 
policies in deciding to permit regular access to unhealthy fast food, 
snacks, and sugared beverages. 
Even though the money gained from the sale of competitive 
food arguably benefits the children, a proprietary or ministerial 
decision is one that, in the words of the Chambers court, can be 
characterized as “primarily a source of revenue.”134  Lunchtime à la 
carte fast food fit this description, and so does the sale of FMNV in 
vending machines.  In fact, the outcome in Chambers135 can be 
distinguished from many school districts’ food operations, where 
schools specifically enter into high-stakes pouring-rights contracts 
worth millions of dollars with private corporations.  In this case, 
profits are the primary motive.  The serving of competitive à la carte 
fast food and FMNV in vending machines in schools, therefore, is 
very much a business enterprise, a proprietary activity, from which 
the schools seek to profit.136 
Likewise, the outcome in Krueger, where the court broadly 
recognized immunity for the school board, is distinguishable from 
the situation involving the provision of competitive à la carte food.  In 
reaching its decision, the Krueger court emphasized that the school 
 
cases, and a fifth might be needed. 
. . . . 
Calhoun’s food costs per child are almost identical to what they were 
before.  The school pays more for ingredients, but servings are smaller, 
little goes to waste, and because the chefs are employees, there’s no 
catering-company overhead. 
Id. 
 134 Chambers, 424 S.E.2d at 21. 
 135 The Chambers court decided that the city was immune from liability for the 
operation of its garbage collection services because the services were primarily 
beneficial to the public, regardless of some incidental generation of revenues.  Id. at 
22. 
 136 The author is not suggesting that school districts are pocketing profits gained 
from food service for personal uses.  It is understood that profits accrue to the 
schools, and that they are then used to supplement school budgets.  7 C.F.R. § 
210.11(b) (2002).  The insufficiency of school funding, however, should not be 
alleviated by means that pose serious health risks for children. 
  
2004 COMMENT 1075 
did not receive any pecuniary advantage from serving lunches and 
that the service of food was merely a convenience.137  In the situation 
at bar, however, schools are receiving a substantial financial benefit 
from entering into contracts for vending machine sales and 
supplemental à la carte food.138  In fact, the court explicitly stated that 
“[t]he exercise of the right or power by the local governing body is 
not of the nature of a contract,”139 which suggests that if it were of the 
nature of a contract, the analysis would differ.  Thus, the Krueger 
decision supports the notion that if the basis for operating a 
supplemental food service is profit and the school board contracts for 
this pecuniary benefit, it is possible that immunity will not attach. 
Clearly, municipal immunity is an important hurdle to bringing 
an action against a school district or school board of education.  
Whether schools that allow children daily access to unhealthy food 
and beverages will be immune from responsibility for the ensuing 
health damage is a question of law dependent upon the jurisdiction’s 
legal framework.  If the school district is not immune, the next issue 
is whether school districts can be held liable for compounding the 
public health crisis through their role in increasing obesity and poor 
nutrition among American schoolchildren. 
III. AN ARGUMENT FOR NEGLIGENCE 
The common law tort of negligence is “the dominant cause of 
action for accidental injury”140 in America.  Negligence is defined as 
“conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the 
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.”141  Negligent 
conduct can entail an affirmative act (misfeasance) or a failure or 
omission to act (nonfeasance).142  The traditional elements of a 
 
 137 Krueger, 274 S.W. at 813-14.  The court further states, “the duty assumed is 
public in character, and not for profit, but for the public good, and is directly related 
to and in aid of the general and beneficent purposes of the state.”  Id. at 814. 
 138 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
 139 Krueger, 274 S.W. at 814. 
 140 KEETON ET AL., supra note 89, § 28, at 161. 
 141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). 
 142 DOBBS, supra note 89, § 116, at 276.  Liability for misfeasance stems from the 
defendant’s actions, creating a new risk of harm for the plaintiff.  KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 89, § 56, at 373.  Liability for nonfeasance, on the other hand, relates to a 
limited group of relationships wherein “the plaintiff is . . . particularly vulnerable and 
dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds considerable power 
over the plaintiff’s welfare.  In addition, such relations have often involved some 
existing or potential economic advantage to the defendant.”  Id. at 374.  Liability for 
nonfeasance requires a “definite relation between the parties, of such a character 
that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act.”  Id. 
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negligence cause of action are duty, breach of this duty, causation, 
including both “cause in fact” and “proximate cause,” and damages.143  
“An actor is negligent only if his conduct created an unreasonable 
risk of harm to others and the actor recognized, or as a reasonable 
person should have recognized that risk.” 144 
The doctrine of foreseeability is also important in the negligence 
inquiry.145  “Foreseeability is an attempt to predict at what point the 
‘causal relationship between [one person’s] conduct and [another 
person’s] injury is too attenuated, remote or freakish to justify 
imposing liability.’”146  Foreseeability can apply to the identity of the 
victim: a foreseeable victim is one who is not far removed in time and 
space from the defendant’s negligent action.147  Foreseeability can 
also apply to the harm that occurred.  For example, “conduct is not 
negligent unless harm was foreseen by the actor or would have been 
foreseeable to a reasonable person, and the harm could reasonably 
have been avoided.”148  Consequently, foreseeability acts as a limiting 
principle to negate a defendant’s liability if the risk of harm is too 
remote or uncertain to be adjudged within the scope of the 
defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.149 
To state a successful claim against a school district (or school 
board of education) for its decision to serve unhealthy fast food, 
candy, snacks, and sugared beverages based on the foregoing 
principles, an injured student would have to prove that the school 
board knew or reasonably should have known that permitting access 
to unhealthy cafeteria food, sugared beverages, and FMNV would 
 
 143 KEETON ET AL., supra note 89, § 30, at 164-66; DOBBS, supra note 89, §§ 114-15, 
at 269-73.  The duty element is recognized as a legal obligation to conform one’s 
conduct to a standard of care.   KEETON ET AL., supra note 89, § 30, at 164.  The 
standard of care is most frequently judged objectively as “the duty to exercise the 
care that would be exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the same or 
similar circumstances to avoid or minimize risks of harm to others.”  DOBBS, supra 
note 89, § 117, at 277.  The second element of the cause of action, breach of the 
duty, is “[a] failure on the person’s part to conform to the standard required.” 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 89, § 30, at 164.  Causation requires analysis of whether the 
defendant’s conduct is reasonably connected to the plaintiff’s injury.  Id. at 165.  The 
final element, damages, requires the plaintiff to show injury or actual loss.  Id. 
 144 DOBBS, supra note 89, § 143, at 334. 
 145 See generally DOBBS, supra note 89, § 143, at 334-36.  For a criticism of 
foreseeability, see William H. Hardie, Jr., Foreseeability: A Murky Crystal Ball for 
Predicting Liability, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 349 (1992/1993). 
 146 Patricia K. Fitzsimmons & Bridget Genteman Hoy, Visualizing Foreseeability, 45 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 907, 908 (2001) (internal citations omitted). 
 147 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting). 
 148 DOBBS, supra note 89, § 143, at 334. 
 149 See Hardie, supra note 145, at 350. 
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cause injury and that the school board failed to take reasonable 
measures to avoid that harm, or worse, even encouraged 
consumption.  The elements that a plaintiff would have to prove are 
(1) the school authority owed a duty to the plaintiff to provide an 
environment that furthers the development of good nutrition and 
healthy eating habits; (2) the school breached that duty by regularly 
serving, and thus implicitly endorsing, food dangerously high in fats, 
cholesterol, salt, and sugars; (3) the regular consumption of this food 
caused adverse health consequences; and (4) the plaintiff was injured 
thereby.  Thus, the inquiry into negligence is articulated as whether a 
reasonable school board knew or should have known that, by 
providing daily access to unhealthy fast-food and FMNV, students 
would be more likely to consume those unhealthy choices, and that 
the pervasive availability of competitive fast-food would substantially 
decrease the likelihood that students would make nutritious food 
choices, thereby causing significant deleterious effects to health.150 
A. Duty and Breach of Duty 
1. Duty 
“A person who has custody of another owes a duty of reasonable 
care to protect the other from foreseeable harm.”151  The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts states that “a child while in school is deprived of 
the protection of his parents or guardian.  Therefore, the actor who 
takes custody of . . . a child is properly required to give him the 
protection which the custody or the manner in which it is taken has 
deprived him.”152  Thus, the school’s duty stems from its physical 
custody of the students.153  The degree of care a school owes to its 
students is likened to the care that a parent of ordinary prudence 
would give under similar circumstances.154  This duty requires 
 
 150 See Chris Woolston, School Lunches: Invasion of the Body Fatteners, CONSUMER 
HEALTH INTERACTIVE (discussing several rationales behind schools’ decisions to serve 
unhealthy food and the difficulty that children have in making healthy food 
choices), at http://blueprint.bluecrossmn.com/topic/schoollunch (last visited Sept. 
25, 2002) (on file with author). 
 151 DOBBS, supra note 89, § 326, at 884. 
 152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 cmt. b (1965). 
 153 Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, Liability for Negligent Supervision in the Schools, 
213 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1995). 
 154 See, e.g., Merson v. Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist., 286 A.D.2d 668, 669 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001) (citing Lawes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 213 N.E.2d 667 (N.Y. 
1965)).  The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[w]hile we do not, of 
course, suggest that public schools as a general matter have such a degree of control 
over children as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to protect,’ we have 
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maintaining reasonable supervision over the students and protecting 
the students’ health, safety, and welfare.155 
Although attaching liability to the provision of unhealthy food 
and beverages in schools is novel,156 based on in loco parentis157 
principles, schools have assumed a custodial relationship with their 
students and should be required to function in their students’ best 
interests, which includes behaving as would ordinarily prudent 
parents.  Arguably, the ordinarily prudent parent would not regularly 
serve high-fat, high-calorie food and soft drinks for dinner.  Thus, a 
school, acting in the same capacity, would likely be acting 
unreasonably if it served unhealthy food every day for lunch.  Indeed, 
as one nutritionist has noted, “[n]o sensible parent would take their 
kid to a fast-food restaurant every day.  But if that’s available in a 
cafeteria, that’s what kids are going to eat.”158  Ultimately, when a 
school acts in the capacity of a parent of ordinary prudence, that 
school must espouse the philosophy of a reasonable parent, which 
presumably does not include fast food at every meal. 
As discussed above, schools are responsible to protect the health 
and welfare of their students.  This duty entails the obligation to 
maintain a healthy, nutrition-conscious environment in the school.159  
Several arguments support this obligation.  First, schools that 
participate in the NSLP are required by law to “ensure that 
 
acknowledged that for many purposes ‘school authorities ac[t] in loco parentis’ . . . .” 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 155 See, e.g., Rogers v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New Haven, 749 A.2d 1173, 1176 
(Conn. 2000) (noting that the board of education’s administrative procedural 
manual provides that “[s]chool officials have a duty to protect the health, safety and 
welfare of all students under their authority”); City of New York v. Keene Corp., 505 
N.Y.S.2d 782, 786 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (stating that plaintiff school district has a 
“common law duty to provide a safe and healthy environment for school children, 
which arises from the fact that, in New York, school attendance is compulsory, and 
from the parens patriae obligation of plaintiffs [to] care for their minor charges while 
at school”). 
 156 A tort claims statute may require courts to exercise judicial restraint in 
“accepting novel causes of action against public entities within the scope of the 
statute.”  57 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 89, § 94, at 129.  The issue of public health, 
however, has been recognized as “one, if not the, critical issue in society.”  Pelman v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  The seriousness of the 
childhood obesity epidemic and the permanent health disabilities associated with it 
presents compelling arguments for why a court should recognize a new cause of 
action, especially in view of a school district’s conduct in promoting and encouraging 
the consumption of certain food and beverages. 
 157 See supra note 11 for the definition of this term. 
 158 Woolston, supra note 150. 
 159 See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the policies behind the 
NSLA and the federal regulations). 
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participating children gain a full understanding of the relationship 
between proper eating and good health,”160 but schools implicitly 
sanction poor nutrition when they permit wide-scale access to fast 
food and FMNV.  This is contradictory to nutritional lessons that 
schools teach in classes.161  Schools have a unique opportunity to 
implement lessons in nutrition during lunch period by practicing 
what they preach.162  In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,163 the 
Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he process of educating our 
youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the 
curriculum, and the civics class; schools much teach by example the 
shared values of a civilized social order.”164  Teachers and 
administrators act as role models to inculcate the values and morals 
of our society.165  Although Fraser dealt with civil discourse and 
political expression and was decided under First Amendment 
precepts, the pedagogical method, “teach by example,” supports the 
argument that school districts have a duty to promote healthy 
environments by setting examples of moderation and good health 
rather than “teaching excess”166 and poor nutrition. 
Second, even though à la carte fast food and FMNV fall outside 
the federal nutritional regulations, the acknowledged fact that this 
food undermines the integrity of the NSLP167 suggests that schools 
should refrain from serving, or at a minimum, restrict the availability 
of unhealthy food and beverages in order to maintain their duty to 
provide healthy and nutrition-oriented meals. 
 
 160 7 C.F.R. § 210.1 (2002). 
 161 Guidelines for School Health Programs, supra note 7, at 1-2, 14, 20. 
 162 See NESTLE, supra note 40, at 196 (“Whether school officials like it or not, they 
have been delegated the responsibility for teaching children about appropriate food 
choices and setting an example in practice.”). 
 163 478 U.S. 675. 
 164 Id. at 683. 
 165 Id.; see also Martha Y. Kubik et al., Food-Related Beliefs, Eating Behavior, and 
Classroom Food Practices of Middle School Teachers, 72 J. SCH. HEALTH 339 (2002).  This 
study noted that various health behavior theories support the idea that teachers 
influence the dietary practices of their students and that adults who play significant 
roles in the lives of children, like teachers, “influence youth behavior through role 
modeling, normative practices, and social support.”  Id.  The study concluded that, 
“middle school teachers do not role model healthy eating behavior at school and the 
prevalent use of vending is a particular concern.”  Id. 
 166 NOW with Bill Moyers: Buying Access, supra note 56; see also Kubik et al., supra 
note 165 (finding that “the use of food as an incentive/reward for students is a 
common classroom practice among middle school teachers.  Candy was, by far, the 
most frequently used food item, reported by more than seven of 10 teachers, with 
one-third of teachers distributing candy to students on an almost weekly basis”). 
 167 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 41. 
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2. Breach of Duty 
Schools breach their duty to maintain a healthy and nutrition-
conscious environment by allowing their concern for profits to 
override their concern for students’ health.  Breach stems not from 
the sale of one soda or one hamburger but from the overall 
pervasiveness of the à la carte fast-food selections, vending machine 
snacks and beverages, and FMNV available in schools.  Since, in the 
majority of school districts, students are not permitted to leave school 
grounds during lunch periods,168 schoolchildren are a captive 
audience.  Schools provide fast food, candy, and sugared beverages 
for sale to students because they know that schoolchildren will eat it 
and because “fast food makes money.”169  Similarly, by aggressively 
promoting soft drink vending machine sales to meet “pouring rights” 
contract quotas,170 schools breach their duty to maintain an 
environment conducive to the health of children out of a concern for 
generating revenue. 
Although not actually forced to eat the school’s competitive fast-
food meals,171 it is dubious whether children can resist the enticing 
assortment of snacks and fast-food selections.172  One reason that 
schoolchildren are unable to choose healthy lunches, for example, 
soup and salad over pizza, tacos, or a hamburger and French fries, is 
their immaturity.  “Because of their lack of maturity, children are not 
able to foresee situations that might be hazardous to their own well-
being, and adults have a responsibility to care for them and to protect 
 
 168 See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 169 Woolston, supra note 150 (noting several “classic rationales” for the sale of 
unhealthy food in schools taken from a survey distributed to California schools.  
Other reasons include the belief that children will only eat fast food and that school 
children don’t have enough time during their lunch period to eat a healthy meal). 
 170 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. For a recent statement on the 
problem of soda consumption in schools, see American Academy of Pediatrics, Soft 
Drinks in Schools, 113 PEDIATRICS 152 (2004), available at http://www.aap.org/ 
advocacy/releases/jansoftdrinks.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). 
 171 Arguably, children could bring their own lunches from home.  This argument 
is baseless because it is unlikely that the millions of children eating school lunches 
would all start bringing lunch from home. 
 172 See Becker & Burros, supra note 48, at A1.  The authors, Becker and Burros, 
visited school cafeterias in New York City and Montgomery County, Maryland, where 
they watched children eating lunch.  Id. at A14.  The authors reported that out of the 
hundreds of children they observed, “only five children took a green vegetable with 
their main course.”  Id.  At one school in Maryland, purchases during one lunch 
period included “440 servings of French fries,” “187 snack cakes,” “118 slices of 
pizza,” and “56 bags of potato chips.”  Id.  “At the bottom of the list were three bowls 
of soup and three fresh salads.”  Id. 
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them from physical harm.”173  Schools thus take advantage of 
schoolchildren’s inability to make nutritionally healthy meal choices 
by providing pervasive access to tempting fast food and FMNV, high 
in fat, calories, salt, and sugar. 
3. School Districts’ Possible Counterarguments 
In order to negate the finding of a breach of duty, school 
districts may argue that students are free to select healthy food,174 and 
that students are aware of the poor nutritional quality of fast food 
and should therefore limit themselves from regularly eating fast food.  
The recent decision in Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.175 relies upon these 
tenuous contentions.  In Pelman, the plaintiffs, two obese minors who 
regularly ate at McDonalds’ restaurants, sued McDonald’s 
Corporation for, among other things, common law negligence.176  
The plaintiffs claimed that they developed “diabetes, coronary heart 
disease, high blood pressure, [and] elevated cholesterol intake”177 as a 
result of consuming McDonald’s fast food.  They argued that 
McDonald’s negligently sold food that was high in fat, salt, sugar, and 
cholesterol; negligently failed to warn consumers of the potential 
health hazards of eating its food; and negligently marketed food that 
was addictive, both physically and psychologically.178  The court, 
however, disagreed.  In dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim that the food 
contained negligently high levels of fat, cholesterol, salt, and sugar, 
the court highlighted plaintiffs’ failure to allege that McDonalds’ 
products are “so extraordinarily unhealthy that they are outside the 
reasonable contemplation of the consuming public.”179  The court 
noted that “[n]obody is forced to eat at McDonald’s. . . .  Even more 
pertinent, nobody is forced to supersize their meal or choose less 
healthy options on the menu.  As long as a consumer exercises free 
choice with appropriate knowledge, liability for negligence will not 
attach.”180 
 
 173 Lyndon G. Furst, When Children Assault Children: Legal and Moral Implications for 
School Administrators, 102 ED. L. REP. 13, 27 (1995).  Although this article discusses 
school duty in the context of physical assault, the proposition that children lack the 
ability to foresee situations that could cause them harm arguably applies to the daily 
consumption of unhealthy food as well. 
 174 School meal plans offer a variety of dishes.  Telephone Interview with Denise 
Burgess, Glen Ridge School District Food Service Manager, Aramark (Nov. 2002). 
 175 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 176 Id. at 519. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 520. 
 179 Id. at 532. 
 180 Id. at 533.  What constitutes a healthy option is in dispute.  For example, as 
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The Pelman court’s decision to dismiss the negligence claim 
rested two factors: an individual’s common knowledge or 
understanding about the poor nutritional quality of the fast food and 
that person’s freedom to choose to eat that food.181  It may be 
reasonable to believe that the average consumer knows that eating at 
McDonald’s every day means eating food that is high in fat, salt, 
sugar, and cholesterol and yet freely chooses to do so.182  It is 
inappropriate, however, to impute this knowledge and freedom of 
choice to children in a school cafeteria setting.  Schoolchildren have 
an only limited understanding of the nutritional values of food;183 and 
furthermore, they may associate school food with the food that a 
parent prepares.184  Schools contracting with outside food-service 
companies, however, offer à la carte food that is as high in calories, 
fat, sugar, and salt as those available in fast-food restaurants.185  Thus, 
an argument that schools are not liable because schoolchildren have 
knowledge of the nutritional value of the food served in school and 
should know better than to eat food high in fat, sugar, and salt is 
tenuous at best.186 
In addition to arguing that schoolchildren are aware of the 
nutritional qualities of the food they eat, schools may also attempt to 
defend themselves by demonstrating that they serve a diverse 
selection of à la carte food such as nutritious soups, salads, and 
sandwiches, from which students are free to choose.  But, as has been 
observed in nutritional studies of lunchroom eating behavior, 
students are not likely to choose vegetables or salads over pizza, 
 
noted in the opinion, “Chicken McNuggets, while seemingly a healthier option than 
McDonald’s hamburgers because they have ‘chicken’ in their names, actually contain 
twice the fat per ounce as a hamburger. . . .  It is at least a question of fact as to 
whether a reasonable consumer would know—without recourse to the McDonald’s 
website—that a Chicken McNugget contained so many ingredients other than 
chicken and provided twice the fat of a hamburger.” Id. at 535. 
 181 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
 182 Id. at 532. 
 183 Mahshid Pirouznia, The Correlation Between Nutrition Knowledge and Eating 
Behavior in an American School: The Role of Ethnicity, 14 J. NUTRITION & HEALTH 89 
(2000) (testing a group of sixth, seventh, and eighth-grade students to determine 
their level of nutrition knowledge and whether knowledge of nutrition affected food 
choices.  The students “were not able to identify the food sources of nutrients or 
nutrient functions, and they did not use a daily food guide to choose food, although 
they were aware of the importance of milk and vegetable consumption”). 
 184 See Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 536. 
 185 See Becker & Burros, supra note 48, at A14; Wechsler et al., supra note 7. 
 186 This statement is additionally supported by the fact that the provision 
mandating notification of the nutritional content of lunches was repealed.  See supra 
notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
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French fries, and snacks.187  Thus, nutritious food, albeit available, is a 
less attractive option to students, and therefore not a real alternative 
when served in conjunction with fast food and FMNV. 
B. Causation and the Foreseeability of Harm 
After establishing that schools owe a duty to schoolchildren and 
have breached that duty, the plaintiff in this proposed cause of action 
must next prove that the school board’s decision to permit pervasive 
access to unhealthy food caused the harm that the plaintiff alleges, 
and that the harm was foreseeable to a reasonable school board and 
thus could have been avoided.  In the lexicon of negligence, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that “but for” regular, unguided access, 
the plaintiff would not have eaten such harmful, non-nutrative food, 
and that eating the unhealthy food on a regular basis was a proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s harm.  Meeting the burden of causation in a 
negligence action, however, can be a formidable barrier to recovery 
in cases in which multiple factors or intervening actions muddy the 
link between the defendant’s negligent conduct and the plaintiff’s 
injury.188 
The Pelman court applied a “substantial factor” test to determine 
whether the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged proximate cause.189  The 
court stated that to demonstrate proximate cause “a plaintiff must 
establish that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial cause in 
 
 187 Becker & Burros, supra note 48, at A1, A14. 
 188 The plaintiff must show not only that the defendant’s conduct “be negligent 
toward the other, but also that the negligence of the actor be a legal cause of the 
other’s harm.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965); see also DOBBS, supra 
note 89, § 183, at 452-53.  Dobbs states “[w]ith slight variations in the words, courts 
usually instruct juries or begin their own appellate discussions with a formal 
definition asserting that a proximate cause of an injury is one which, in a natural and 
continuous sequence, without any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury.” 
Id. § 183, at 453. 
 189 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 537-38 (internal citation omitted).  The Restatement 
instructs that what constitutes “legal cause” is “(a) conduct [that] is a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor 
from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the 
harm.”   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at § 431.  The Restatement further 
addresses important considerations in the analysis of whether negligent conduct is a 
substantial factor: 
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the 
harm and the extent of the effect which they have in producing it; (b) 
whether the actor’s conduct has created a force or series of forces 
which are in continuous and active operation up to the time of the 
harm, or has created a situation harmless until acted upon by other 
forces for which the actor is not responsible; (c) lapse of time. 
Id. at § 433. 
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bringing about the harm.”190  The court noted that several factors 
bear upon this determination, such as the “number of actors involved 
which contribute to the harm and the effect which each has in 
producing it, and whether the situation was acted upon by other 
forces for which the defendant is not responsible.”191  The court 
ultimately held that “[n]o reasonable person could find probable 
[sic] cause based on the facts in the Complaint without resorting to 
‘wild speculation.’”192  Specifically, the link between eating 
McDonald’s food and obesity was “wild speculation” because the 
complaint did not indicate how frequently the plaintiffs ate at 
McDonald’s.193  The court granted leave to amend the complaint194 
and suggested that, “[w]hile the assignment of such a frequency is 
beyond the competency of the Court at this time, it seems like the 
frequency must be more than once per week, a figure cited by 
plaintiff’s counsel in oral argument as a potentially unhealthy 
figure.”195 
By comparison, a school’s conduct in permitting the sale of fast 
food and FMNV to its schoolchildren is likely to be a substantial cause 
of the harm to children’s health.  Schoolchildren can consume à la 
carte fast-food meals, salty snacks, cakes, and sweetened beverages 
five days a week in their lunchrooms, not to mention trips to the 
vending machines for FMNV before and after meal times.  Schools 
serve competitive fast food on a daily basis, and do not restrict the 
number of times that a child can order fast food for lunch or visit a 
vending machine for a soda and candy after school.  Schools thus 
affirmatively create an environment that is inimical to good health 
and welfare.  Because of the frequency of consumption and the 
availability of non-nutritious food and beverages, there is a much 
greater opportunity to find a causal connection between the school’s 
decision to provide unlimited access to unhealthy food and a 
plaintiff’s health-related injuries, without having to resort to “wild 
speculation.” 
In continuing its discussion of causation, the Pelman court 
acknowledged that “a number of factors other than diet” could lead 
to obesity and its related health problems.196  This point is also 
 
 190 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 537-38. 
 191 Id. at 538. 
 192 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 193 Id. at 538-39. 
 194 Id. at 543. 
 195 Id. at 539. 
 196 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (“‘Obesity is a complex multifactoral chronic 
disease developing from interactive influences of numerous factors—social, 
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significant for causation analysis, because intervening factors can 
break the chain of causation, thereby removing liability.  The court 
warned that to prevail in suit the “Complaint must address these 
other variables, and if possible, eliminate them or show that a McDiet 
is a substantial factor despite these other variables.”197  This 
requirement holds true in the school context as well.  But, merely 
pointing to other possible socio-economic or medical reasons for 
obesity is not a sufficient defense because studies have shown that the 
recent upward trend in obesity is far more likely to be linked to an 
increase in eating, especially eating food laden with fat, cholesterol, 
salt, and sugar.198  Although heredity plays a role in weight gain,199 
studies indicate that the recent “alteration in human weight 
development is too rapid to reflect a plausible shift in population 
genetics and more likely reflects a change in societal dietary and 
exercise patterns.”200  Thus, by providing an outlet for schoolchildren 
to purchase unhealthy food on a daily basis, a school not only 
compounds the likelihood of a student contracting an obesity-related 
injury, but also creates an environment where poor eating habits are 
the norm. 
Another intervening factor that could defeat causation is the 
role that parents play with regard to their children’s lunchtime food.  
A school could argue that parents who provide their children with 
lunch money to purchase a school lunch instead of making a healthy 
lunch themselves waive the right to sue because they tacitly accept the 
school’s decision to serve à la carte fast food.  This argument is not 
viable, however, because of the recognition that schools have a duty 
to act as an ordinarily prudent parent, and an ordinarily prudent 
parent would not be likely to serve fast food every day.201  
 
behavioral, physiological, metabolic, cellular, and molecular’ in addition to cultural 
and genetic factors.”) (internal citations omitted).  But see McTigue et al., supra note 
4 (noting that the speed by which the obesity epidemic has affected children cannot 
be attributed to physiological or genetic permutations and is more likely related to 
diet and physical activity).  Many schools have reduced or eliminated physical 
education programs in response to budget woes, and have restricted other physical 
activities.  See, e.g., Jerry Barca, Child’s Play No More—Schools Ban Playground Classics 
Amid Injury and Self-Esteem Fears, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Nov. 18, 2002, at col. 1.  
Schools across New Jersey are banning classic outdoor games like tag and dodgeball 
out of fear of lawsuits resulting from falls and rising insurance premiums.  Id.  Thus, 
another avenue to exercise is removed from the daily routine of some 
schoolchildren. 
 197 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 539. 
 198 McTigue et al., supra note 4, at 863; see also Ebbeling et al., supra note 1, at 476. 
 199 Ebbeling et al., supra note 1, at 474-75. 
 200 McTigue et al., supra note 4, at 863. 
 201 See supra Part III.A for further discussion. 
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Furthermore, although a parent may give his or her child lunch 
money, it does not mean that the parent intends the child to eat 
unhealthy food.  As has been observed, children do not possess self-
restraint when confronted with arguably tasty, but nonetheless 
unhealthy food.202  Additionally, this argument does not address the 
culpable role that a school may play in actively encouraging the 
consumption of unhealthy food and beverages.203 
Finally, the foreseeability of harm also plays a significant role in 
the analysis of causation.  Foreseeability of harm, again, means that 
the actor recognizes or, as a reasonable person should recognize, that 
his actions create unreasonable risk of harm.204  An unreasonable risk 
is one that could reasonably be avoided or minimized.205  Thus, in 
determining what is foreseeable, a school board’s knowledge or 
recognition of the harm is an important component,206 as is the ease 
with which a school board could minimize or avoid the harm.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that actors are required to 
know “(a) the qualities and habits of human beings . . . so far as they 
are matters of common knowledge at the time and in the community; 
and (b) . . . general customs in so far as they are likely to affect the 
conduct of the other or third persons.”207  Schools, however, are not 
insurers of students’ safety.208  Based on the theory of negligent 
supervision, for example, a school district would not be liable where 
it had no reason to foresee that an injury-producing event would take 
place.209  “The possibility of foreseeing an event that brings harm or 
injury to a student is one of the basic requirements of negligence in 
situations where a student is injured.”210 
Applying the foregoing principles to the school lunch dilemma, 
one can argue that school districts have created a foreseeable and 
unreasonable risk of harm by providing unhealthy food and 
beverages to schoolchildren.  It is foreseeable that children will 
 
 202 Becker & Burros, supra note 48, at A1, A14. 
 203 See supra notes 56-62. 
 204 DOBBS, supra note 89, § 143, at 334. 
 205 Id. 
 206 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 (1965). 
 207 Id. 
 208 See, e.g., Mirand v. City of New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
 209 For example, in the case of a spontaneous and unanticipated attack of a 
student by a third party.  See Mirand, 637 N.E.2d at 266.  But see, e.g., Decker v. 
Dundee Cent. Sch. Dist., 151 N.E.2d 866 (N.Y. 1958) (holding a school negligent in 
the situation where a girl was injured after jumping off bleachers where such activity 
was a common occurrence). 
 210 Furst, supra note 184, at 28. 
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choose unhealthy food over more nutritious options,211 and it is 
foreseeable that these choices will lead to known health risks.212  
School boards are deemed to know, or at least reasonably should 
know, of the health risks associated with fast food.213  Not only are 
school boards attributed with this common knowledge because of the 
intense media attention that the obesity epidemic has received in the 
last several years,214 but also because widespread experience with food-
related health problems is common in the United States today. 
Moreover, schools could easily avoid the harm that they create 
by restricting or eliminating pervasive access to unhealthy food.  This 
way, school districts can play a pro-active role in battling childhood 
obesity and at the same time minimize their liability and the costs 
associated with fighting a lawsuit.  Some suggestions to minimize 
harm include serving healthy, nutritious lunches rather than fast 
food, or at least severely restricting the service of à la carte fast food.  
School districts might also consider withdrawing vending machines 
from school property, or stocking vending machines with healthy 
drinks and snacks like milk, water, 100 percent fruit juice, and fresh 
or dried fruits and vegetables.215  Additionally, by using the statutory 
provision previously stricken from an earlier version of the NSLA,216 
school districts could adopt policies to inform their constituents of 
the nutritional values associated with the weekly menu, so that 
parents and children could participate in planning meals more 
knowledgeably.217 
C. Damages 
The health risks associated with obesity for children are 
 
 211 Becker & Burros, supra note 48, at A1, A14. 
 212 See infra Part III.C. 
 213 Dietary programs designed especially for school lunches have been 
implemented in various states.  For example, the “Hearty School Lunch” program 
propounded by the American Heart Association in 1991 and geared to cafeteria food 
service directors has been implemented in the past in New Jersey.  Jonathan Jaffe, 
Program Seeks to Upgrade School Lunches, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 8, 1991.  An 
Illinois program called Dietary Guidelines: Best of the Best Kit, was implemented by 
the Illinois Nutrition Education and Training Program and involved educators and 
child nutrition staff in fifteen Illinois schools.  The full program description can be 
accessed at http://www.kidseatwell.org/team/nia.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). 
 214 See supra Introduction and infra Part III.C. 
 215 For example, school districts in California and New York have begun to 
implement these changes. 
 216 See supra note 27. 
 217 See supra notes 27-31and accompanying text. 
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numerous.  Medical studies of children218 have shown that childhood 
obesity leads to increased risk of cardiovascular disease, gallbladder 
disease, pulmonary complications such as sleep apnea, asthma, and 
exercise intolerance, and type II diabetes,219 which until recently was 
virtually unrecognized in adolescents.220  “The increasing prevalence 
and severity of obesity in children, together with its most serious 
complication, type 2 diabetes, raise the spectre of myocardial 
infarction becoming a paediatric disease.”221  Serious psychosocial 
problems are also linked to childhood obesity.  Children who are 
overweight are often discriminated against by their peers.222  
“Overweight children as young as age 5 years can develop a negative 
self-image, and obese adolescents show declining degrees of self [-] 
esteem associated with sadness, loneliness, nervousness, and high-risk 
behaviours.”223 
 
 218 David S. Freedman et al., Relationship of Childhood Obesity to Coronary Heart 
Disease Risk Factors in Adulthood: The Bogalusa Heart Study, 108 PEDIATRICS 712 (2001).  
See generally William H. Dietz, Health Consequences of Obesity in Youth: Childhood 
Predictors of Adult Disease, 101 PEDIATRICS 518 (1998). 
In testimony before the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, 
Dr. Mohammad Akhter, Executive Director of the American Public Health 
Association, described statistics related to the adverse health consequences of obesity 
in children, stating: 
The rates of diabetes increased by 50 percent between 1990 and 2000.  
Due to rising rates among children, type 2 diabetes can no longer be 
called “adult onset” diabetes.  Heart disease is also associated with 
obesity.  Sixty percent of overweight children as young as five to ten 
years old already have high cholesterol, high blood pressure, or other 
early warning sign[s] for heart disease. 
Testimony of the National Alliance for Nutrition and Activity Before the House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Labor Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies, 107th 
Cong.  (April 30, 2002) (statement of Dr. Mohammad Akhter, Executive Director, 
American Public Health Assoc.), at http://www.apha.org/legislative/testimonies/ 
nana.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2002) (on file with author). 
 219 Type II diabetes is “a chronic, life-long disease that results when the body’s 
insulin does not work effectively.  Insulin is a hormone released by the pancreas in 
response to increased levels of blood sugar (glucose) in the blood.”  MEDLINEPLUS 
MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, Type 2 diabetes  (providing a detailed exegesis of the disease), 
at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000313.htm (last visited Mar. 
15, 2004) (on file with author).  There is no known cure for type II diabetes and the 
primary treatment revolves around diet and exercise.  Id.  Complications from type II 
diabetes include hypertension, atherosclerosis, coronary artery disease, amputation 
and blindness.  Id.  The medical costs and lost productivity costs associated with type 
II diabetes nationwide are estimated to be $132 billion in 2002, up from $98 billion 
in 1997.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Study Shows Sharp 
Rise in the Cost of Diabetes Nationwide (Feb. 27, 2003) (on file with author). 
 220 Ebbeling et al., supra note 1, at 473. 
 221 Id. at 478. 
 222 Dietz, supra note 218. 
 223 Ebbeling et al., supra note 1, at 474. 
  
2004 COMMENT 1089 
Obesity is directly related to food consumption.224  As noted 
earlier, obesity contributes significantly to an array of grave medical 
problems as a consequence of the physical damage to bodily 
functions.  Regular consumption of typical high-calorie and high-fat 
fast food and FMNV significantly increases the chance of developing 
an obesity-related medical condition because the food that American 
schoolchildren consume outside the home is “demonstrably higher 
in calories, fat, saturated fat, and salt as well as lower in more 
desirable nutrients.”225  In addition to the harmful saturated (and 
trans) fat found in typical fast food served in schools, the 
consumption of excess refined sugar226 and caffeine in soft drinks and 
other non-carbonated, sugar-sweetened beverages also creates serious 
medical problems with the potential for long-term side effects.227  
 
 224 See McTigue et al., supra note 4. 
 225 NESTLE, supra note 40, at 176 (citing Claude Cavadini et al., US Adolescent Food 
Intake Trends from 1965 to 1996, 83 ARCH. DIS. CHILD. 18 (2000)). 
 226 NORTH CAROLINA SCHOOL NUTRITION ACTION COMMITTEE, SOFT DRINKS AND 
SCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN: TRENDS, EFFECTS, SOLUTIONS (2002) [hereinafter SOFT 
DRINKS].  “On average, adolescents get 11% of their calories, or 15 teaspoons of 
sugar [per day] from soft drinks. This high consumption of sugar is contrary to the 
Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2000 which recommend choosing sensibly to limit 
intake of beverages and food that are high in added sugar.”  Id.; see also Michael F. 
Jacobson, Liquid Candy: How Soft Drinks Are Harming Americans’ Health, at 
http://www.cspinet.org/sodapop/liquid_candy.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004): 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) recommends that people 
eating 1,600 calories a day not eat more than six teaspoons a day of 
refined sugar, 12 teaspoons for those eating 2,200 calories and 18 
teaspoons for those eating 2,800 calories.  To put those numbers in 
perspective, consider that the average 12- to 19- year-old boy consumes 
about 2,750 calories and 1½ cans of soda with 15 teaspoons of sugar a 
day; the average girl consumes about 1,850 calories and one can with 
ten teaspoons of sugar.  Thus, teens just about hit their recommended 
sugar limits from soft drinks alone.  With candy, cookies, cake, ice 
cream, and other sugary food, most exceed those recommendations by 
a large margin. 
Jacobson, supra. 
 227 Jacobson, supra note 226.  Among the major health concerns associated with 
the consumption of soft drinks are osteoporosis, tooth decay, heart disease, kidney 
stones, and behavioral problems linked to caffeine addiction, such as nervousness, 
irritability, difficulty falling asleep, rapid heart beat, and allergic reactions caused by 
additives.  Id.  Osteoporosis is especially troubling because although it takes years to 
develop, “[t]he risk of osteoporosis depends in part on how much bone mass is built 
early in life.  Girls build 92% of their bone mass by age 18, but if they don’t consume 
enough calcium in their teenage years they cannot ‘catch up’ later.”   Id.Caffeine 
compounds the problem because it “increases the excretion of calcium in urine.  
Drinking 12 ounces of caffeine-containing soft drink causes the loss of about 20 
milligrams of calcium, or two percent of the U.S. RDA.”  Id.  Some medical 
professionals believe that osteoporosis should now be considered as “a pediatric 
disease with geriatric consequences.”  Neville H. Golden, Osteoporosis Prevention: A 
Pediatric Challenge, 154 ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLESC. MED. 542 (2000); see also Anne-Lise 
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When milk is replaced by soft drinks, children significantly decrease 
their intake of magnesium, vitamins A and C, and riboflavin and 
increase the consumption of phosphoric acid and other additives.228  
“[S]oft drinks pose health risks both because of what they contain 
(for example, sugar and various additives) and what they replace in 
the diet (beverages and food that provide vitamins, minerals and 
other nutrients).”229  Moreover, caffeine is “a mildly addictive 
stimulant drug.”230  Researchers link classroom behavior problems to 
consumption of soda containing caffeine.231 
In a negligence action, damages is an essential element that a 
plaintiff must prove to prevail on her claim.232  “Unless she has 
suffered legally recognized harm, she has no claim for damages and 
cannot recover even a nominal sum.”233  Legally recognized harm 
 
Carrié Fässler & Jean-Philippe Bonjour, Osteoporosis as a Pediatric Problem, 42 PEDIATR. 
NUTR. 811, 820 (1995) (noting that although osteoporosis was once considered only 
a geriatric disease, “there is now a general agreement that predisposition begins in 
childhood and adolescence”); Grace Wyshak, Teenaged Girls, Carbonated Beverage 
Consumption, and Bone Fractures, 154 ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLESC. MED. 610 (2000).  
Wyshak concludes that there is a positive statistical association between carbonated 
beverage consumption and bone fractures.  Wyshak, supra, at 610.  Wyshak posits that 
the association stems from the fact that colas contain phosphoric acid.  Id. at 612.  
Exposure to phosphorus has been linked to bone fractures since the 19th century.  
Id.  Phosphorus interferes with the process of calcium metabolism and the build up 
of bone mass.  Id.  But see Press Release, The National Soft Drink Association & 
Georgetown University Center for Food & Nutrition Policy, Two New Studies Refute 
Assumption That Soft Drink Consumption by School-Aged Children is Contributing 
to Childhood Obesity (Apr. 17, 2000), at http://www.nsda.org (on file with author). 
 228 SOFT DRINKS, supra note 226; see also Jacobson, supra note 226; Lisa Harnack et 
al., Soft Drink Consumption Among US Children and Adolescents: Nutritional Consequences, 
99 J. AM. DIET. ASS’N 436, 439 (1999). 
 229 Jacobson, supra note 226. 
 230 Id.; see also Gail A. Bernstein et al., Caffeine Withdrawal in Normal School-Age 
Children, 37 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSY. 858 (1998) (“Caffeine is the most 
common psychoactive drug consumed in the world, and it is capable of causing 
addiction.  Caffeine is also the only psychoactive drug that can be legally purchased 
by children.”). 
 231 Bernstein et al., supra note 230, at 864 (“Children who drank a high daily dose 
of caffeine manifested decreased attention. . . .  The findings suggest that withdrawal 
from caffeine may have detrimental effects on attention and performance in normal 
children.  Decreased attention may create learning difficulties, particularly at 
school.”). 
 232 DOBBS, supra note 89, § 377, at 1047.  In order to mitigate or eliminate liability, 
the defendant will likely argue that the plaintiff’s own actions contributed to his or 
her injury under the theory of contributory negligence, which in most states “will 
reduce the plaintiff’s damages but not necessarily defeat her claim.”  DOBBS, supra 
note 89, § 114, at 269.  The defendant may also argue that the plaintiff assumed the 
risk of her actions. Id. 
 233 Id. 
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includes physical injury.234  In the school food context, the plaintiff 
must therefore allege some physical injury that he or she claims is the 
result of consuming unhealthy fast food, sodas and snacks while at 
school.  The physical injury necessary to meet the damages element 
need not be actual obesity but may be a harm associated with obesity 
or the daily consumption of unhealthy food and beverages, such as 
the onset of type II diabetes or pulmonary complications,235 a 
significant increase in dental caries,236 a dangerous rise in cholesterol 
level,237 bone fractures occurring because of a calcium deficiency 
linked to soda consumption,238 or behavioral problems associated with 
caffeine addiction.239 
CONCLUSION 
The law should recognize a negligence claim against a school 
district for allowing the school environment to become a place in 
which schoolchildren can easily access harmful food high in calories, 
fat, cholesterol, salt, and sugar.  A negligence cause-of-action serves 
the important social goal of restoring control to parents whose 
children have been injured by a school board’s actions in creating the 
unhealthy environment.  Schoolchildren are a captive audience; 
schools have physical custody over their students, and in a majority of 
jurisdictions, children must remain in school during lunch.  Because 
of this level of control over students, schools have a well-recognized 
duty to provide a safe and healthy environment.  This duty includes 
eschewing profits derived from the sale of unhealthy food, beverages, 
and snacks and instead supplementing classroom lessons in good 
nutrition with the service of healthy food at lunchtime.  Where 
schools fail to meet this responsibility, thereby implicitly sanctioning 
poor nutrition by allowing daily, unregulated access to à la carte fast 
food, snacks, candy, and sodas, they should be liable for the ensuing 
health damage. 
 
 234 Id. 
 235 See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. 
 236 See Jacobson, supra note 226 (discussing tooth decay as a health problem 
magnified by the consumption of sodas and sugared food and beverages). 
 237 For example, “[a] parent of a sixth grader said she took her son for a physical 
last year and his cholesterol count rose significantly.  She stated that he ate lunch 
everyday last year at the Ridgewood Avenue school and believes that this contributed 
to the rise in her son’s cholesterol count.  She also said she would like to see less 
fried food and more fruit offered to the students.”  Glen Ridge Bd. of Educ., Food 
Service Operations Meeting Minutes, Oct. 7, 2003 (on file with author). 
 238 See supra note 227. 
 239 See supra notes 230-31and accompanying text. 
